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Abstract: The current research examined whether social power affects what
people find funny. In two experiments, participants’ psychological state of social
power was experimentally manipulated and their evaluations of offensive jokes
were assessed. Results showed that participants in a psychological state of high
power – as compared to low power – evaluated offensive jokes as less inap-
propriate, less offensive, and funnier. Mediation analyses showed that power
increased the funniness of offensive jokes through decreasing the perceived
inappropriateness of these jokes. Implications for research on power and
humor are discussed.
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1 Introduction
People’s attempts to be funny come in many forms, for instance, by telling
jokes that make fun of other people (e.g., members of a minority group).
Although these jokes may amuse people, they can also be perceived as inap-
propriate and offensive, thereby attenuating the extent to which these jokes are
perceived as funny. What makes such humor attempts more or less successful
depends on the appraisals (i.e., subjective evaluations) of the receivers of these
jokes. A recent theory on humor – Benign Violation Theory (BVT) – suggests
that humor occurs when something seems wrong (i.e., a violation) yet also
okay (i.e., benign; Peter and Warren 2010; Peter et al. 2015). According to BVT,
humor is a psychological response characterized by the appraisal that some-
thing is funny, the positive emotion of amusement, and the tendency to laugh
(Gervais and Wilson 2005; Martin 2007; Veatch 1998). The current research
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addresses a straightforward but interesting question: does a psychological
state of social power influence the appraisal and perceived funniness of
offensive jokes? Based on BVT and theories on social power, we propose that
a state of high social power – as compared to low – decreases the appraised
inappropriateness of offensive jokes and thereby increases the perceived fun-
niness of these jokes.
1.1 Social power as a psychological state
Social power has been defined as asymmetric control over valued resources in
social relations (Keltner et al. 2003; Magee and Galinsky 2008; Rucker et al.
2012). Ample research has shown that power is a psychological state. Feeling
powerful or powerless can be activated by instructing participants to recall
autobiographical events where they felt powerful or powerless and has the
exact same effects as those obtained using structural and role-based manipula-
tions of power (Anderson & Galinsky 2006; Galinsky et al. 2003). Such psycho-
logical states of power have been demonstrated to have important and far-
reaching consequences for how people behave. In their review paper on
power, Keltner et al. (2003) concluded that individuals feeling powerful: (a)
experience and express more positive – approach related – emotions (e.g.,
amusement) and less negative – inhibition related – emotions (e.g., embarrass-
ment), (b) attend more to social rewards, (c) construe others in terms how they
satisfy their own goals and needs, (d) cognize their social environment in more
automatic, simplistic fashion, and (e) behave in disinhibited and sometimes
counter-normative ways. In contrast, individuals feeling powerless: (a) experi-
ence and express less positive emotions and more negative emotions, (b) attend
more to punishment and threat, (c) make more careful, controlled judgments
about others’ intentions, attitudes, and actions, and (d) inhibit their own beha-
vior and act contingently on others.
More recent research corroborated and strengthened the notion that social
power has important and far-reaching consequences for many aspects of human
behavior. For example, studies have shown that the powerful act more (e.g., are
more likely to take another card in a game of blackjack or are more likely to
remove an annoying electric fan), supporting the notion that powerful indivi-
duals experience less social constraints and show less inhibition as compared to
the powerless (Galinsky et al. 2003). Furthermore, consistent with the notion
that people in power have control over valued resources and are therefore less
dependent on others, studies have shown that a high-power state hinders
perspective-taking (Galinsky et al. 2006) and compassion (Van Kleef et al. 2008).
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1.2 Social power and humor
The aforementioned theorizing and findings concerning social power provide a
clear basis for predictions how social power will influence the evaluation of
offensive jokes. As a psychological state of high power – compared to low – is
associated with less social constraints, less inhibition, more psychological dis-
tance from others, and less distress and compassion in reaction to the suffering
of others, we should observe that powerful individuals evaluate offensive jokes
as less inappropriate and less offensive. We should also observe that more
powerful individuals evaluate offensive jokes as funnier and are more willing
to tell these jokes to someone else – because they tend to experience more
approach related positive emotions (e.g., amusement) and behave in more
disinhibited and counter-normative fashion. Moreover, we propose that these
latter effects are mediated by differences in appraised inappropriateness. That is,
we expect that more social power increases the perceived funniness of and
willingness to tell offensive jokes through a decreased perceived inappropriate-
ness of these jokes.
The relationship between social power and (offensive) humor has been
addressed in prior research. These previous studies, for instance, examined how
joking can serve to help structure local interaction hierarchies (Robinson and
Smith-Lovin 2001), how high status group members differ from low status group
members in their ratings of appropriateness of (offensive and non-offensive) jokes
(Smeltzer and Leap 1988), or how the frequency of using subversive humor differs
between informal and workplace meetings (Holmes and Marra 2002). The present
research adds importantly to this prior work by being the first to combine social
psychological research on social power with a recent theory on humor – Benign
Violation Theory. Important, our research is the first to study the evaluation of
offensive jokes using an experimental manipulation of social power, thereby
allowing to draw causal conclusions regarding the impact of social power on
the perceived appropriateness, offensiveness, and funniness of offensive jokes
and people’s willingness to tell these jokes to others.
1.3 Overview of the present research
The present research examines the impact of social power on the evaluation of
offensive jokes. Moreover, we sought to provide a first test of a possible mechan-
ism through which social power might affect humor. Experiment 1 examines the
effects of social power on participants’ evaluations of offensive jokes by placing
them into a psychological state of high or low power and assessing their
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evaluations of offensive jokes in terms of inappropriateness, offensiveness,
funniness, and willingness to tell the joke to someone else. Experiment 2 is a
conceptual replication and extension of our first experiment and tests the same
hypotheses as Experiment 1. In this second experiment, we included additional
measures and also explored whether social power increases moral hypocrisy in
the context of offensive jokes. Both experiments demonstrate that participants
who feel more powerful evaluate offensive jokes as less inappropriate, less
offensive, and funnier. Moreover, both experiments provide mediation evidence
that more powerful participants evaluate offensive jokes as funnier, because
they appraise them as less inappropriate.
2 Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we hypothesized that participants induced to feel powerful will
evaluate offensive jokes as less inappropriate, less offensive, and funnier, and
that they will be more willing to tell these jokes to someone else – relative to a
powerless condition. Moreover, we hypothesized that powerful participants
evaluate offensive jokes as funnier and are more willing to tell these jokes
because they appraise them as less inappropriate.
2.1 Method
2.1.1 Participants, design, and procedure
Eighty-nine undergraduates at a Dutch university (60 women; Mage = 20.42 years,
SDage = 2.69) were randomly assigned to a high-power (n= 39) or low-power condi-
tion (n= 50). Although participants were told that they would take part in two
unrelated studies, in reality they participated in one experiment consisting of two
(related) parts. In the first part of the experiment, a psychological state of high or
social power was experimentally induced. Whereas in the second part, participants
were asked to evaluate a series of jokes. Upon completing both parts, participants
were probed for suspicion, debriefed, thanked, and rewarded for their participation.
2.1.2 Power manipulation
Power was experimentally manipulated through an episodic priming task (cf.
Galinsky et al. 2003; Mooijman et al. 2015). Participants in the high-power
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condition were asked to recall and write about a situation in which they had
power over others. More specifically, they were asked the following:
Please recall a particular incident in which you had power over another individual or
individuals. By power, we mean a situation in which you controlled the ability of another
person or persons to get something they wanted, or were in a position to evaluate those
individuals. Please describe this situation in which you had power – what happened, how
you felt, etc.
Participants in the low-power condition were asked to recall and write about a
situation in which others had power over them. More specifically, they were
asked the following:
Please recall a particular incident in which someone else had power over you. By power,
we mean a situation in which someone had control over your ability to get something you
wanted, or was in a position to evaluate you. Please describe this situation in which you
did not have power – what happened, how you felt, etc.
2.1.3 Joke evaluations
Participant were asked to read 21 jokes and to evaluate each joke in terms of
inappropriateness (Cronbach’s α=0.93), offensiveness (α=0.93), and funniness
(α=0.89) – on scales from 1 to 7 (a higher score indicated that participants
evaluated the joke as more inappropriate, more offensive, or funnier). They were
also asked to indicate for each joke – on scales from 1 to 7 – their willingness to
tell the joke to somebody else (α=0.91; a higher score indicated a higher will-
ingness to tell the joke).1
The jokes were selected on the basis of a pilot study, in which 37 under-
graduates at a Dutch university evaluated 60 jokes in terms of inappropriate-
ness, offensiveness, and funniness. Of the selected jokes, seven were related to a
disability, seven were related to ethnicity, and seven were related to gender.
These jokes had inappropriateness ratings that were higher than the overall
mean of all jokes of one type. The mean funniness of selected jokes did not differ
between types of jokes (Moverall = 3.14, SD= 1.02), F(1, 36) = 2.81, p=0.13.
1 Inappropriateness was significantly correlated to offensiveness (Pearson’s r=0.88; p < 0.001),
funniness (r=–0.30; p=0.004), and willingness to tell (r=–0.40; p < 0.001). Offensiveness was
significantly correlated to funniness (r=–0.25; p=0.017) and willingness to tell (r=–0.26;
p=0.013). Funniness was significantly related to willingness to tell (r =0.79; p < 0.001). The
patterns of these correlations were similar in both power conditions.
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2.2 Results and discussion
To test our hypotheses, we conducted four mixed Analyses of Variance
(ANOVAs) with power (high, low) as between-participants variable, type of
joke (disability-jokes, ethnicity-jokes, gender-jokes) as repeated measure, and
inappropriateness, offensiveness, funniness, and willingness to tell as depen-
dent variable, respectively.
2.2.1 Inappropriateness
Results yielded a statistical significant main effect of power on inappropriateness,
F(1, 87) = 14.41, p < 0.001, pη=0.14. High-power participants evaluated the jokes as
less inappropriate (M= 3.59, SD=0.87) than low-power participants (M=4.34,
SD=0.96). Results also showed a significant main effect of type of joke, F(2,
174) = 438.95, p < 0.001, pη2 = 0.84. Gender-jokes (M= 2.11, SD= 1.14) were evaluated
as less inappropriate than ethnicity-jokes (M= 5.16, SD= 1.14; t[89] = 23.76,
p < 0.001) and disability-jokes (M=4.77, SD= 1.19; t[89] = 22.19, p < 0.001). The latter
two means also differed significantly from each other, t(89) = 4.99, p < 0.001.
No significant interaction effect was found between power and type of joke, F(2,
174) = 1.84, p=0.16.
2.2.2 Offensiveness
Results yielded a significant main effect of power on offensiveness, F(1, 87) = 12.25,
p=0.001, pη2 = 0.12. High-power participants evaluated the jokes as less offensive
(M= 3.35, SD=0.96) than low-power participants (M= 4.08, SD= 1.01). Results also
showed a significant main effect of type of joke, F(2, 174) = 430.54, p < 0.001,
pη2 = 0.83. Gender-jokes (M= 1.91, SD= 1.04) were evaluated as less offensive than
ethnicity-jokes (M= 4.91, SD= 1.27; t[89] = 24.50, p < 0.001) and disability-jokes
(M=4.46, SD= 1.30; t[89] = 22.78, p < 0.001). The latter two means also differed
significantly from each other, t(89) = 4.93, p < 0.001. No significant interaction effect
was found between power and type of joke, F(2, 174) = 2.29, p=0.10.
2.2.3 Funniness
Results yielded a significant main effect of power on funniness, F(1, 87) = 4.54,
p=0.038, pη2 = 0.049. High-power participants evaluated the jokes as funnier
(M= 3.38, SD=0.93) than low-power participants (M= 2.92, SD= 1.08). Results
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also showed a significant main effect of type of joke, F(2, 174) = 54.45, p < 0.001,
pη2 = 0.39. Gender-jokes (M= 3.93, SD= 1.14) were evaluated as funnier than
ethnicity-jokes (M= 2.63, SD= 1.36; t[89] = 8.45, p < 0.001) and disability-jokes
(M= 2.81, SD= 1.27; t[89] = 7.41, p < 0.001). The latter two means also differed
significantly from each other, t(89) = 2.36, p =0.021. No significant interaction
effect was found between power and type of joke, F < 1.
2.2.4 Willingness to tell
Results yielded a trend of power on willingness to tell, F(1, 87) = 2.57, p =0.11,
pη2 = 0.029. High-power participants were slightly, but not statistical significant,
more willing to tell the jokes to someone else (M = 2.60, SD= 1.05) than low-
power participants (M= 2.25, SD=0.98). Results did show a significant main
effect of type of joke, F(2, 174) = 29.06, p < 0.001, pη2 = 0.25. Participants were
more willing to tell gender-jokes (M= 2.95, SD= 1.23) than disability-jokes
(M= 2.16, SD= 1.15; t[89] = 5.76, p < 0.001) or ethnicity-jokes (M= 2.11, SD= 1.27;
t[89] = 5.93, p < 0.001). No significant interaction effect was found between power
and type of joke, F(2, 174) = 1.11, p=0.33.
2.2.5 Mediation analyses
We hypothesized that social power increases the funniness of offensive jokes
through decreasing the perceived inappropriateness of these jokes. To test for
this mediation, we followed the recommendations of Preacher and Hayes (2008)
who suggest using a bootstrapping procedure to compute confidence intervals
around the indirect effects (i.e., the path through the mediator). If zero falls
outside an interval, mediation can be said to be present. We used the SPSS
macros that Preacher and Hayes provide for this procedure. In a first mediation
analysis, condition (high-power vs. low-power) was the independent variable,
funniness was the dependent variable, and inappropriateness was the mediator.
Whereas in an additional second mediation analysis, we included offensiveness
as the mediator. We used a bootstrapped mediation analysis with 5,000 boot-
strap resamples and bias-corrected and accelerated intervals. We used single
mediator analyses with either inappropriateness or offensiveness as mediator.
Because of multicollinearity (i.e., the possible mediators were correlated, see
Footnote 1), we could not include inappropriateness and offensiveness in one
model, as multiple mediation analyses are conducted under the assumption that
the possible mediators are uncorrelated.
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Results showed that the effect of power on funniness was mediated by a
decrease in inappropriateness (95% CI = [–0.51, –0.01]), but not by a decrease in
offensiveness, 95% CI = [–0.41, 0.02]. More specific, the significant effect of
power on funniness (β=–0.22, t=−2.11, p =0.038) was reduced to non-signifi-
cance (β=–0.12, t=−1.13, p=0.26) when inappropriateness was added to the
model (which by itself still predicted funniness, β=–0.25, t=−2.23, p=0.023).
These results indicate that power increased the funniness of offensive jokes
through decreasing perceived inappropriateness.
Results of Experiment 1 showed a clear effect of power on the evaluation of
offensive jokes. High-power participants – as compared to low-power partici-
pants – evaluated offensive jokes as less inappropriate, less offensive, and
funnier. Moreover, results indicate that these effects were not contingent on
the type of joke. Although results did not yield a significant effect of power on
the willingness to tell an offensive joke, they did reveal a (slight) trend in the
expected direction.
3 Experiment 2
The second experiment was a conceptual replication and extension of
Experiment 1. In this experiment, we used a different and smaller set of offensive
jokes, included two additional measures, added several items to measure our
main dependent variables, and added another experimental factor to the design.
More specific, participants’ feelings of power and mood were assessed
directly after the episodic priming task. The first assessment enables us to
check whether our power manipulation had an effect on participants’ feelings
of power and indicates whether or not our manipulation of social power was
successful. The second assessment enables us to check whether our power
manipulation affected participants’ general mood. This is important to check,
as a diffuse (positive or negative) mood may predispose participants to experi-
ence similarly toned emotions as a suitable emotion-evoking stimulus is pre-
sented to them (e.g., an offensive joke). If our power manipulation shows the
intended effect on participants’ feelings of social power, but not an unintended
effect on their general mood, the observed differences between experimental
conditions in the evaluation of offensive jokes can be attributed to differences in
feelings of social power, but not to differences in general mood and thereby to a
higher predisposition to experience similarly toned emotions.
We also included a more specific assessment of offensiveness. That is, we
assessed the extent to which participants considered the jokes about disabilities,
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ethnicity, and gender offensive to members of these specific groups.
Furthermore, we assessed participants’ joke evaluations in terms of inappropri-
ateness and funniness with two items instead of one.
In addition to conceptually replicating our first study, we explored whether
power increases moral hypocrisy in the context of offensive jokes. Earlier
research has shown that – compared to individuals lacking power – powerful
individuals judge their own moral transgressions more acceptable, but the same
transgressions committed by others less acceptable (Lammers et al. 2010).
Therefore, we asked some participants to evaluate offensive jokes imagining
telling these jokes themselves, whereas we asked others to evaluate the jokes if
these were told by another person. A moral hypocrisy effect would be obtained if
high-power participants evaluate offensive jokes as less inappropriate, less
offensive, and funnier when these jokes were told by themselves as compared
to when they were told by another person.
3.1 Method
3.1.1 Participants, design, and procedure
Participants were 164 undergraduates at a Dutch university (83 women;
Mage = 20.42 years, SDage = 2.69), who were randomly assigned to one of four
conditions of a 2 (power induction: high, low) X 2 (perspective: self, other)
between-participants design (with 40 to 42 participants in each condition). The
procedure was similar to Experiment 1.
3.1.2 Power manipulation, manipulation check, and mood assessment
Power was manipulated using the same episodic priming task as in Experiment 1.
Following the power induction, participants were presented with 23 words and
asked to indicate – on scales from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very much) – how applicable
each word was to their current thoughts and feelings. Answers to the following
seven items were averaged and served as a power manipulation check: influential,
powerful, dominant, important, submissive, unimportant, and dependent (answers to
the last three items were reverse-scored; α=0.74). Answers to the following 16 items
were averaged and served as an assessment of participants’ mood: lively, happy,
caring, satisfied, energetic, calm, loving, active, sad, tired, unenergetic, cranky, ner-
vous, jumpy, down, and dissatisfied (answers to the last eight items were reverse-
scored; α=0.87). The 23 items were presented in a mixed order to participants.
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3.1.3 Joke evaluations
Participants were asked to read 12 jokes (three disability-jokes, four ethnicity-
jokes, five gender-jokes) and to indicate – on seven-point scales (1 = not at all;
7 = very much) – the extent to which they evaluated the joke as funny and
enjoyable (averaged to form an assessment of funniness; α=0.91) and as inap-
propriate and indecent (averaged to form an assessment of inappropriateness;
α=0.91). Next, they were asked to indicate – on three seven-point scales (1 = not
at all; 7 = very much) – the extent they evaluated the joke as offensive for
disabled people (α =0.73), members of certain ethnic groups (α=0.80), and
men or women (α=0.84). Last, participants were asked to indicate – on a
seven-point scale (1 = I would never tell this joke to somebody; 7 = I would cer-
tainly tell this joke to somebody) – their willingness to tell the joke (this question
was only asked in the self condition; α =0.73).2
3.1.4 Self- versus other-perspective manipulation
In the self-perspective condition participants were asked to answer all questions
while imagining that they themselves would tell the joke, whereas participants
in the other-perspective condition were asked to answer all questions while
imagining that somebody else, who was unknown to them, would tell the joke.
3.2 Results and discussion3
3.2.1 Manipulation check and mood assessment
An independent samples t-test yielded a significant effect of power on the
manipulation check items, t(162) = 2.26, p=0.025. High-power participants felt
2 Inappropriateness was significantly correlated to offensiveness (r=0.68; p < 0.001), funniness
(r=–0.49; p < 0.001), and willingness to tell (r=–0.49; p < 0.001). Offensiveness was significantly
correlated to funniness (r=–0.26; p=0.001), but not to willingness to tell (r=–0.19; p=0.09).
Funniness was significantly correlated to willingness to tell (r=0.89). The patterns of these
correlations were similar in both power conditions.
3 We did not include gender as a factor in our research. When we checked Experiment 2 for
possible gender differences, we found no significant interaction effect between social power
and gender on any of the assessed dependent variables. This indicates that indeed our social
power manipulation had the same effect for female and male participants. However, women, as
compared to men, evaluated disability-jokes as more inappropriate, more offensive, and less
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more powerful (M= 2.79, SD=0.45) than low-power participants (M = 2.63,
SD=0.49). Results of an additional t-test showed that – before they read and
evaluated the jokes – high-power participants (M= 3.14, SD=0.46) did not differ
in their mood from low-power participants (M= 3.04, SD=0.44), t(162) = 1.54,
p=0.13. This indicates that our manipulation of power was successful – it had
the intended effect on participants’ feelings of social power, but not an unin-
tended effect on their general mood.
3.2.2 Self- versus other-perspective
Initial mixed ANOVAs with power (high, low) and perspective (self, other) as
between-participants variables, type of joke (disability-jokes, ethnicity-jokes,
gender-jokes) as repeated measure, and inappropriateness, offensiveness, and
funniness as dependent variables yielded no significant main or interaction
effects of perspective (Fs < 2.21, ps > 0.13). Therefore we, subsequently, conducted
four separate mixed ANOVAs with power as between-participants variable, type
of joke as repeated measure, and inappropriateness, offensiveness, funniness,
and willingness to tell the joke as dependent variable, respectively.
3.2.3 Inappropriateness
Results yielded a significant main effect of power on inappropriateness, F(1,
162) = 6.88, p =0.010, pη2 = 0.041. High-power participants evaluated the joke as
less inappropriate (M= 3.26, SD= 1.20) than low-power participants (M= 3.72,
SD= 1.07). Furthermore, results yielded a significant main effect of type of
joke, F(2, 324) = 99.62, p < 0.001, pη2 = 0.38. Disability-jokes (M=4.19, SD= 1.47)
were evaluated as more inappropriate than ethnicity-jokes (M= 3.18, SD= 1.24;
t[164] = 11.05, p < 0.001) and gender-jokes (M = 3.11, SD= 1.23 t[164] = 10.62,
p < 0.001). The latter two means did not differ significantly from each other,
t(164) = 1.17, p=0.24.
Also a significant interaction effect was obtained between power and type of
joke, F(2, 324) = 4.48, p=0.012, pη2 = 0.027. Inspection of the relevant means
funny and were less willing to tell these jokes to someone else. Furthermore, women evaluated
ethnicity-jokes as more inappropriate and less funny and they rated gender-jokes as more
offensive. Note that we did not check for possible gender differences in Experiment 1, because
in this experiment the absolute number of male participants was too low to conduct any
meaningful analyses with gender as an additional factor in our design.
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showed that the difference in inappropriateness between high-power and low-
power participants was larger for disability-jokes (M= 3.81 [SD= 1.51] vs. M=4.56
[SD= 1.33]; t[162] = 3.39, p =0.001) than for gender-jokes (M= 2.98 [SD= 1.29] vs.
M= 3.24 [SD= 1.18]; t[162] = 1.36, p=0.18) and ethnicity-jokes (M= 2.99 [SD= 1.29]
vs. M= 3.37 [SD= 1.18]; t[162] = 1.99, p=0.05). The finding that the effect of power
on the evaluation of offensive jokes in terms of inappropriateness was more
pronounced for jokes that were perceived as more offensive is, in our view,
consistent with our theoretical framework.
3.2.4 Offensiveness
In the mixed ANOVA concerning offensiveness, the type of offensiveness question
was included as an additional repeated measure. Results of this analysis yielded no
main effect of power on offensiveness, F < 1. Results did show a significant main
effect of type of joke (F[2, 324]= 109.16, p < 0.001, pη2 = 0.40), indicating that parti-
cipants’ means for all three offensiveness questions were higher for disability-jokes
(M= 2.44, SD=0.79) than for ethnicity-jokes (M= 2.02, SD=0.73; t[164] = 8.50,
p < 0.001) and gender-jokes (M= 1.84, SD=0.67; t[164]= 13.85, p < 0.001). Whereas
these means were higher for ethnicity-jokes than for gender-jokes (t[164]= 5.99,
p < 0.001). Results also yielded a significant main effect of type of offensiveness
question (F[2, 324] = 86.09, p < 0.001, pη2 = 0.35), indicating that participants’means
for the questions related to offensiveness towards disabled people were higher
(M= 2.39, SD=0.71) than for those related to offensiveness towards members of
ethnic groups (M= 2.01, SD=0.71; t[164] = 8.50, p < 0.001) and towards men or
women (M= 1.91, SD=0.76; t[164] = 11.86, p < 0.001). Whereas these means were
higher for the questions related to offensiveness towards members of ethnic groups
than towards men or women, t(164) = 3.35, p=0.001.
Furthermore, results yielded a significant interaction effect between type of
joke and type of offensiveness question (F[4, 648] = 672.41, p < 0.001, pη2 = 0.81),
indicating that participants evaluated: (a) disability-jokes more offensive for
disabled people (M=4.66, SD= 1.57) than for men or women (M= 1.37,
SD=0.79; t[164] = 27.23, p < 0.001) and members of ethnic groups (M= 1.28,
SD=0.68; t[164] = 27.31, p < 0.001). The latter two means also differed signifi-
cantly form each other (t[164] = 2.90, p =0.004), (b) gender-jokes more offensive
for men or women (M= 3.07, SD= 1.28) than for members of ethnic groups
(M= 1.24, SD=0.62; t[164] = 20.22, p < 0.001) and disabled people (M= 1.22,
SD=0.55; t[164] = 20.14, p < 0.001), and (c) ethnicity-jokes more offensive for
members of ethnic groups (M = 3.50, SD= 1.41) than for men and women
(M= 1.29, SD=0.64; t[164] = 21.65, p < 0.001) and disabled people (M= 1.29,
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SD=0.66; t[164] = 21.34, p < 0.001). These results indicate that, as intended,
participants evaluated disability-jokes as most offensive for disabled people,
gender-jokes as most offensive for men or women, and ethnicity-jokes most
offensive for members of ethnic groups.
Although results yielded no significant main effect of power, they did yield a
significant three-way interaction between power, type of joke, and type of offen-
siveness question (F[4, 648] = 3.44, p=0.009, pη2 = 0.021), indicating that the
difference between high-power and low-power participants was larger for their
evaluation of offensiveness towards disabled people for disability-jokes (M= 4.94
vs. M= 4.39; t[162] = 2.28, p=0.024) than for their evaluation of offensiveness
towards men or women for gender-jokes (M= 3.04 vs. M= 3.10; t[162] = 0.30,
p=0.77) and their evaluation of offensiveness towards members of ethnic groups
for ethnicity-jokes (M= 3.35 vs. M= 3.65; t[162] = 1.38, p=0.17). The other means
for their evaluation of offensiveness varied between 1.22 and 1.37 (see Figure 1).
The obtained significant three-way interaction between power, type of joke, and
type of offensiveness question indicates that high-power evaluated disability-
jokes less offensive for disabled people than low-power participants. The
absence of a significant main effect of power might be due to the fact that
ethnicity-jokes and gender-jokes were overall evaluated as less offensive than
disability-jokes and suggests that the effect of power on the evaluation of jokes
is more pronounced when jokes are more offensive. This is consistent with the
obtained results for the evaluation of jokes in terms of inappropriateness.
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Figure 1: Mean offensiveness scores for three types of jokes and three types of offensiveness
questions.
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3.2.5 Funniness
Results yielded a significant main effect of power on funniness, F(1, 162) = 6.72,
p=0.010, pη2 = 0.040. High-power participants evaluated the jokes as funnier
(M= 3.76, SD= 1.13) than low-power participants (M= 3.35, SD=0.99).
Furthermore, results yielded a main effect of type of joke, F(2, 324) = 41.52,
p < 0.001, pη2 = 0.20. Disability-jokes (M = 2.99, SD= 1.45) were evaluated as
less funnier than ethnicity-jokes (M = 3.81, SD= 1.23; t[164] = 7.88, p < 0.001) and
gender-jokes (M= 3.82, SD= 1.36; t[164] = 7.16, p < 0.001). No significant interac-
tion effect was found between power and type of joke, F < 1.
3.2.6 Willingness to tell
Results yielded a trend of power on willingness to tell, F(1, 79) = 2.98,
p =0.088, pη2 = 0.036. High-power participants were slightly more willing to
tell the joke (M = 3.30, SD =0.92) than low-power participants (M = 2.95,
SD =0.89). Although results only yielded a trend of power, the obtained
means were in the expected direction. Furthermore, results yielded a main
effect of type of joke, F(2, 158) = 14.56, p < 0.001, pη2 = 0.16. Participants were
less willing to tell disability-jokes (M = 2.67, SD = 1.28) than gender-jokes
(M = 3.37, SD = 1.11; t[81] = 4.38, p < 0.001) and ethnicity-jokes (M = 3.32,
SD = 1.14; t[81] = 4.30, p < 0.001). No significant interaction effect was found
between power and type of joke, F < 1.
3.2.7 Mediation analyses
Because of multicollinearity (i.e., the possible mediators were correlated, see
Footnote 2), we used single mediator analyses with either inappropriateness
or offensiveness as mediator. Results of a bootstrapped mediation analysis
(cf. Experiment 1) showed that the effect of power on funniness was mediated
by a decrease in inappropriateness (95% CI = [-0.47, -0.07]), but not by a
decrease in offensiveness, 95% CI = [-0.11, 0.02]. More specifically, the sig-
nificant effect of power on funniness (β = -0.19, t =−2.45, p =0.016) was
reduced to non-significance (β =0.09, t = 1.33, p =0.19) when inappropriate-
ness was added to the model (which by itself still predicted funniness, β = -
0.48, t =−6.83, p < 0.001). These results indicate that power increased the
funniness of offensive jokes through decreasing its perceived
inappropriateness.
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4 General discussion
In two experiments, we provide evidence that social power affects the evaluation
of offensive jokes. Consistent with the notion that high-power leads one to
experience less social constraints, show less inhibition, experience more dis-
tance from others, and respond with less distress and compassion to the suffer-
ing of others, we found that participants in a psychological state of high power –
relative to low power – evaluated offensive jokes as less inappropriate and less
offensive. Furthermore, consistent with the notion that feeling more powerful
leads to the experience of more approach related positive emotions and less
inhibition related negative emotions, we found that high-power – relative to
low-power – individuals evaluated offensive jokes as funnier. Moreover, media-
tion analyses showed that social power increased the funniness of offensive
jokes through decreasing perceived inappropriateness. Last, consistent with the
notion that a state of high power leads to more disinhibited behavior, we found
a slight indication that high-power – relative to low-power – individuals were
more willing to tell offensive jokes to someone else. Although this last finding
did not reach statistical significance, in both experiments we did observe trends
in the expected direction.
The present research indicates that occupying a powerful or powerless
position matters for one’s appreciation of offensive jokes. Those who occupy
the upper echelons of society may be less likely to be offended by offensive
humor compared to those who reside on the bottom rung of society. As such, our
results add an important contextual factor to the growing psychological litera-
ture on humor (Peter and Warren 2010; McGraw et al. 2012; McGraw et al. 2014).
Humor is not only a property of the joke (e.g., severity of a joke, distance from a
joke) but is also dependent on the psychological state of those to whom the joke
is communicated. Benign Violation Theory (Peter and Warner 2014; McGraw
et al. 2014) proposes that a potential joke is deemed funny when: (a) it violates
a norm, (b) the violation is benign, and (c) both perceptions occur simulta-
neously. For a violation to be perceived as benign, it has to be appraised as
acceptable. Although the jokes used in the current research were clear norm
violations, results of our mediation analyses showed that participants who felt
more powerful appraised offensive jokes as less inappropriate (i.e., more accep-
table) and therefore as funnier. This finding might be due to power decreasing
empathic responses (Van Kleef et al. 2008) and increasing psychological dis-
tance towards others (Magee and Smith 2013). Indeed, previous research has
demonstrated how people find more humor in tragedies when they are tempo-
rally, socially, or hypothetically distant (McGraw et al. 2012).
Social power and offensive jokes 99
Brought to you by | Universiteit Leiden / LUMC
Authenticated
Download Date | 1/22/18 8:50 AM
4.1 Limitations and directions for future research
One limitation of the present research is that we did not include a base-line
power condition in our experiments; therefore, it remains unclear whether the
obtained effects of power are (primarily) due to a psychological state of high
power or low power. Although we have no empirical findings to answer this
question, we expect that our effects are affected by both psychological states of
power. Some indication for the validity of our expectation can be derived from
comparing the mean funniness ratings in Experiment 1 (M= 3.38 and M= 2.92 in
the high power and low power condition, respectively) with the mean funniness
rating in our pilot study (M= 3.14). The observation that the mean in our pilot
study (in which participants were in a relative power-neutral state) was in
between the means of the high-power and low-power participants of
Experiment 1 suggests that a psychological state of powerfulness makes offen-
sive humor funnier, whereas a state of powerlessness makes it less funny. This is
of course a less than ideal comparison and future studies, in which a base-line
power condition is included, could provide more definite answers to this
question.
Another limitation of the present research is that our studies did not include
non-offensive jokes; therefore, it remains unclear whether social power leads to
greater perceived funniness of jokes in general independent of how offensive the
jokes are. Although this remains an empirical question that future research
could address, our data provide some preliminary insights in this issue. In
Experiment 2 we found that the effect of power on the evaluation of offensive
jokes in terms of inappropriateness was more pronounced for jokes that were
perceived as more offensive. This might suggest that – even if social power leads
to greater perceived funniness of jokes in general – the effect of social power
might be larger when jokes are more offensive. It should be noted, however, that
we did not find a significant interaction between social power and type of joke in
Experiment, which one would have expected if our suggestion holds. Future
studies could examine this interesting question in more detail to arrive at more
conclusive answers.
In our present research is that we relied on only one experimental manip-
ulation of power. Although previous research has demonstrated that an episodic
priming task yield the exact same effects as those obtained using other manip-
ulations of power (Anderson & Galinsky 2006; Galinsky et al. 2003), future
studies on the relation between power and humor could include different
manipulations of power (e.g., structural or role-based manipulations of power).
In our second experiment, we did not obtain a moral hypocrisy effect. There
could be several reasons for this lack of effect. For instance, in the research of
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Lammers et al. (2010) – on which we based our hypothesis concerning power
and moral hypocrisy – cheating, breaking the speed limit, tax fraud, and steal-
ing were used as moral transgressions. Perhaps telling offensive jokes was not
considered as a clear moral transgression and therefore no moral hypocrisy
effect was found. Furthermore, in our research we assessed the inappropriate-
ness of the jokes itself and not the moral evaluation of telling an offensive joke.
In other words, we might not have assessed the most relevant variable to find a
moral hypocrisy effect. Future studies could include an assessment of how
acceptable it is for oneself or for another person to tell a specific offensive
joke. This would be, in retrospect, a better test for the existence of a moral
hypocrisy effect in the context of offensive jokes.
The present research, in our view, provides an excellent starting point for a
more extended examination of the effects of power on humor and we hope that
our experiments will spark more studies on this intriguing topic. For example,
future studies could provide more insights in the impact of the characteristics of
the individual who tells an offensive joke or the characteristics of the individual
an offensive joke is being told to (e.g., group membership, status). It is con-
ceivable that the former characteristics influence the perceived inappropriate-
ness of an offensive joke, whereas the latter influences one’s willingness to tell
an offensive joke. Furthermore, studies could investigate the extent to which
power holders believe others to share their view on offensive humor. In other
words, do power holders realize that others might consider inappropriate what
they find humorous? To test this, one could manipulate the extent to which
participants viewed the jokes through their own perspective or the perspective of
someone else. Earlier research (Galinsky et al. 2006; Overbeck and Droutman
2013) has indicated that power holders’ view of others is heavily anchored on
their own attitudes, therefore one could predict that a self versus other perspec-
tive matters less for powerful than for powerless individuals.
Although we used Benign Violation Theory as a theoretical framework for our
present research, we do not suggest that our findings are at odds with other
theories on humor, for example, incongruity theories. Benign Violation Theory is a
recent theory on humor and more specific research is needed to examine whether
and when this theory contributes above and beyond other theories on humor.
5 Conclusions
In our introduction we raised the question whether the psychological state of
social power influences the appraisal and perceived funniness of offensive jokes.
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By demonstrating that individuals in a state of high power evaluate offensive
jokes as funnier research through decreasing the perceived inappropriateness of
these jokes, we have provided not only a positive answer to this question but
also important insight in the underlying mechanisms through which social
power affects humor.
References
Anderson, Cameron & Adam D. Galinsky. 2006. Power, Optimism, and Risk-taking. European
Journal of Social Psychology 36. 511–536.
Galinsky, Adam D., Deborah H. Gruenfeld & Joe C. Magee. 2003. From power to action. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology 85. 453–466.
Galinsky, Adam D., Joe C. Magee, M. Ena Inesi & Deborah H. Gruenfeld. 2006. Psychological
Science 17. 1068–1074.
Gervais, Matthew & David S. Wilson. 2005. The evolution and functions of laughter and humor–
A synthetic approach. Quarterly Review of Biology 80. 395–430.
Holmes, Janet & Meredith Marra. 2002. Over the edge? Subversive humor between colleagues
and friends. Humor – International Journal of Humor Research 15. 65–87.
Keltner, Dacher, Deborah H. Gruenfeld & Cameron Anderson. 2003. Power, Approach, and
Inhibition. Psychological Review 110. 165–184.
Lammers, Joris, Diederik A. Stapel & Adam D. Galinsky. 2010. Power increases hypocrisy:
Moralizing in reasoning, immorality in behavior. Psychological Science 21. 737–744.
Magee, Joe C. & Adam D. Galinsky. 2008. Social hierarchy: The self-reinforcing nature of power
and status. The Academy of Management Annuals 2. 351–398.
Magee, Joe C. & Pamela K. Smith. 2013. The social distance theory of power. Personality and
Social Psychology Review 17. 158–186.
Martin, Rod A. 2007. The psychology of humor–An integrative approach. Burlington, MA:
Elsevier.
McGraw, A. Peter, Caleb Warren, Lawrence E. Williams & Bridget Leonard. 2012. Too close for
comfort, or too far to care? Finding humor in distant tragedies and close mishaps.
Psychological Science 25. 1215–1223.
McGraw, A. Peter, Lawrence E. Williams & Caleb Warren. 2014. The rise and fall of humor:
Psychological distance modulates humorous responses to tragedy. Social Psychology and
Personality Science 5. 566–572.
Mooijman, Marlon, Wilco W. Van Dijk, Naomi Ellemers & Eric Van Dijk. 2015. Why leaders
punish: A power perspective. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 109. 75–89.
Overbeck, Jennifer R. & Vita Droutman. 2013. One for all: Social power increases self- anchoring
of traits, attitudes, and emotions. Psychological Science 24. 1466–1476.
Peter, McGraw, A. & Joel Warner. 2014. The humor code. A global search for what makes things
funny. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Peter, McGraw, A. & Caleb Warren. 2010. Benign violations: Making immoral behavior funny.
Psychological Science 21. 1141–1149.
Peter, McGraw, A., Caleb Warren & Christina Kan. 2015. Humorous complaining. Journal of
Consumer Research 41. 1153–1171.
102 Hans Knegtmans et al.
Brought to you by | Universiteit Leiden / LUMC
Authenticated
Download Date | 1/22/18 8:50 AM
Preacher, Kristopher J. & Andrew F. Hayes. 2008. Asymptotic and resampling strategies for
assessing and comparing indirect effects in multiple mediator models. Behavior Research
Methods 40. 879–891.
Robinson, Dawn T. & Lynn Smith-Lovin. 2001. Getting a laugh: Gender, status, and humor in
task discussions. Social Forces 80. 123–158.
Rucker, Derek D., Adam D. Galinsky & DuBois. David. 2012. Power and consumer behaviour:
How power shapes who and what consumers value. Journal of Consumer Psychology 22.
352–368.
Smeltzer, Larry R. & Terry L. Leap. 1988. An analysis of individual reactions to potentially
offensive jokes in work settings. Human Relations 41. 295–304.
Van Kleef, Gerben A., Christopher Oveis, Ilmo Van Der Löwe, Aleksandr LuoKogan, Jennifer
Goetz & Dacher Keltner. 2008. Power, distress, and compassion: Turning a blind eye to the
suffering of others. Psychological Science 19. 703–723.
Veatch, Thomas C. 1998. A theory of humor. Humor–International Journal of Humor Research 11.
161–215.
Appendix
6 examples of the 21 Jokes used in Experiment 1
Disability jokes. “What do you call a leper in a box? A do-it-yourself kit!”;
“How do know when someone with Down syndrome is standing on a level
surface? When he slavers equally from both corners of his mouth!”
Ethnicity jokes. “What is the difference between a Jew and a pizza? A pizza
doesn’t scream in the oven!”; “What do you call a negro with bone cancer? An
Aero candy bar!”
Gender jokes. “Why do men love women with small hands? Because then
their dicks look bigger!”; “Two blond girls are having a conversation. One girl is
telling the other that this morning she performed a pregnancy test. Then the
other girl asks: ‘Did it contain difficult questions?’”
4 examples of the 12 Jokes used in Experiment 2
Disability joke. “Doctor says to a sick man: ‘Your illness is terminal. It doesn’t
take long before you die. I can only advise you a mud bath.’ Sick man: ‘A mud
bath? But would that not help at all?’ Doctor: ‘No, but then you can already get
used to the earth.’”
Ethnicity joke. “Who invented the triathlon? A Turk: He went by foot to the
swimming pool and came back with a bike!”
Social power and offensive jokes 103
Brought to you by | Universiteit Leiden / LUMC
Authenticated
Download Date | 1/22/18 8:50 AM
Gender jokes. “Why can’t a woman save money? Have you ever seen a
piggy bank with a slit on the underside?”; “Why did Moses wander for 40 years
in the desert? Because men never ask for directions!”
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